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Abstract:  
The aim of paper is to investigate the impact of major religions of the world on collected tax 
revenues, using a panel-mode approach, with 123 countries, for the period 1996-2010. The paper 
extends the literature in the field showing how different types of religion influence the level of 
tax revenues, under an extended set of economic and socio-political control variables. The main 
finding reveals that collected tax revenues tend to increase under Protestant and Muslim 
religions. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
 
Religion represents one of the most important determinants of taxation, the religious dogmas 
heaving a great impact on collected tax revenues through the taxpayers’ behaviour. In a 
sociological framework, the government’s tax revenues are the main result of tax compliance, 
based on tax morale and degree of enforcement (Graetz and Wilde, 1985; Elffers, 1991). In this 
context, the religion transmits its impulse on collected tax revenues through complex tax morale 
- tax compliance nexus. 
As the religious dogmas are not the same for all religions, the intensity of taxpayers’ 
compliance and the level of government tax inputs differ from one religion to other. For major 
world religions, the dogmas have explicit slogans for taxpayers, based on clear religious norms. 
Some evidences in this way are pointed out by Eisenhauer (2008), regarding the case of Roman 
Catholicism (Clough, 1992), Judaism (Tamari, 1998; Cohn, 1998) and Islam (Murtuza and 
Ghazanfar, 1998). For other religions, the taxation rules derive from general dogmatic 
framework in no explicit way. 
The contributions regarding the religion’s implications on collected tax revenues reveal two 
main research directions: first one, focused on the evidence and intensity of connection, and 
second one, developed on the religion types’ impact on collected tax revenues. Whatever is the 
theoretical field, the collection of taxes is “compressed” under the concepts of tax compliance, 
tax fraud or tax evasion. Even so, all concepts determine the same effects on tax revenues: they 
reduce or rice the level of collected tax inputs.  
Tittle (1980) is the main recent exponent of the first theoretical direction regarding the 
religion’s implications on collected tax revenues. The author examines the influence of culture 
and religion on tax evasion in the case of the U.S. and finds a strong correlation between 
mentioned variables. Similar results obtain Coleman and Freeman (1997) in the case of 
Australia, respectively Chan et al. (2000) for Hong Kong and the U.S. 
Grasmick et al. (1991) chooses church attendance and individual religiosity in order to 
capture the religion. Their empirical results are based on a sample of 330 adults (18 and older), 
from the annual Oklahoma City Survey. The main outputs show a significant negative 
relationship between two considered religious variables and tax evasion (when church attendance 
and level of individual religiosity increase, the tax evasion decreases). Torgler (2003) uses the 
tax compliance concept in his research focused on Canada, with data from the WVS. All three 
independent variables - trust in government, pride in being a citizen of Canada, and religiosity - 
have positive effect on tax evasion. Moreover, the effect persists even so a set of control 
variables is used (e.g. age, income, education, gender, marital status, and employment status) 
The relationship between religiosity and tax fraud acceptability is explored by Stack and 
Kposowa (2006), using a set of 37 countries. The researchers find that 39 percent of variation in 
religiosity is explained by tax fraud acceptability. Richardson (2008) investigates the tax evasion 
under impact of culture, religion, legal and political variables. The estimates performed based on 
a sample of 47 countries illustrate that a low level of religiosity generates high level of tax 
evasion across countries. Finally, Peñas and Peñas (2010) select a logit estimation method for 
investigate a sample size with 159 regions and 17 countries. Their results illustrate positive 
correlation between tax morale and religion, age, income, satisfaction with democracy, trust in 
politicians and agreement with redistribution, respectively negative correlation in respect to self-
employment and education. 
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The second direction of research focuses on religious types’ impact on collected tax revenues. 
Furnham (1981) performs a very interesting study about protestant work ethic and attitudes 
towards unemployment, using a sample with 109 subjects took part, 69 males and 40 females. 
The author finds that high degree of protestant work ethic generates more opposition to taxation. 
Extending analysis conducts Guiso et al. (2003). The researchers take into account the main 
world religions and work with the intensity of religious beliefs and economic attitudes. World 
Values Surveys is the source for data-set, with respondents from 66 independent countries and 
three main periods: 1981-1984, 1990-1993 and 1995-1997. After checking for country-fixed 
effects, the conclusion reveals that the Judaism religion has a major negative effect on tax 
payment, followed in order by Protestant, Catholic, Hindu and Muslim religions.  
Torgler (2004) investigates several Asian countries based on a cross-section approach, using 
the World Values Survey wave 3, for the period 1995-1997. He finds that Christian religion 
doesn’t have any significant influence on tax morale, while for Muslim religion, other religions 
and no religions there is a great impact. The author attributes low tax morale for the Philippines 
and high level for Japan, China, and Bangladesh. Two years later, Torgler (2006) extends his 
work over 32 countries, using a weighted ordered probit estimation. The main findings 
emphasise that tax morale rises with age under risk aversion, while the religiosity increases tax 
morale, especially for the Catholics, Hindus, and Buddhists.  
The relationship between taxation and religion is confirmed by major part of contributions, 
with several points of view for both considered research directions. Based on this literature 
framework, the aim of paper is to investigate the impact of major religions of the world on 
collected tax revenues, using a panel-mode approach, with 123 countries, for the period 1996-
2010. The paper extends the literature in the field showing how different types of religion 
influence the level of tax revenues, under an extended set of economic and socio-political control 
variables. The main finding reveals that only the Protestant and Muslim religions have positive 
impact of collected tax revenues. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the methodology and data. 
Section 3 shows the results, while Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2. Methodology and data 
 
 
The implications of religions on collected tax revenues are analysed based on an unbalanced 
large data-set, with 123 cross-sections (123 countries), for the period 1996-2010 (Table 1, in 
Appendix), using a panel model approach. The relatively short period of investigation doesn’t 
have any problem, because one of the advantage of panel models is that ”they can be used to 
analyze dynamics with only a short time series”, as Kennedy (2003) notes. In order to explore 
the relationship between types of religion and taxation, we consider collected tax revenues as 
dependent variable, while for interest explanatory variables we perform a set of religion dummy 
variables.  
The dependent variable is collected tax revenues (τ) and measures the level of tax revenues 
collected by general government in U.S. dollars.  
The interest independent variables are the religion dummy variables κ, π, ο, χ, ψ and ω which 
have value 1 if the considered countries are predominant Catholic (κ), Protestant (π), Orthodox 
(ο), Muslim (χ), Buddhist (ψ) or Hindus (ω), respectively value 0 if not. All dummy variables are 
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performed based on Matthew’s (2008) religion map and capturing all specific religious aspects, 
such as: dogmas, belief in God, denominations, church authority etc.      
As the main hypothesis considers that the types of religion influence the level of collected tax 
revenues, the basic function has this form: 
 
),,,,,( ωψχοpiκτ f= ,                                                       (1) 
 
where τ - the amount of tax revenues in U.S. dollars, and κ, π, ο, χ, ψ, ω - the religion dummy 
variables.  
All other main religion variables are omitted from analysis and absorbed in the constant, 
according to Noland (2005). In respect to the reverse causality, the endogeneity issue cannot be 
evidenced because only the direction “religion - taxation” is valid according to the literature. 
Using natural logarithmic of variable τ, the OLS naïv panel-model 1 has this shape: 
 
itititititititit εωβψβχβοβpiβκβατ +++++++= 543210)ln( ,                     (2) 
 
where α - intercept, β0,..,5 - slops of interest religion dummy variables,  i - country, t - time and 
remainder, and itε  - the error term, which varies over both country, and time.  
The effects of religion dummy variables are isolated entering three types of control variables: 
one derived from appropriate tax literature, one inspired by macroeconomic policy, and another 
one represented by robustness variables. In this case, the extended linear model becomes: 
 
itti
n
k
itkkitititititititit X ελµβωβψβχβοβpiβκβατ ++++++++++= ∑
=1
,543210)ln( ,              (3) 
 
where α - intercept, β0,..,5 - coefficients of interest dummy variables,  βk - coefficient of control 
independent variable k by n type, X - control independent variables, µi - stands for country fixed 
effects, λt - time-specific effect that controls for unaccounted common time-varying factors, i - 
country, t - time, and itε  - the error term.  
The first set of control variables is originated in the appropriate tax literature and includes: 
gross domestic product per capita (GDP per capita), size of industrial sector and size of 
agricultural sector. GDP per capita measure the amount of GDP in US dollars divided by 
midyear population. Size of industrial sector and size of agricultural sector explain the value 
added by industrial/agricultural sector as percent in GDP. 
The second group of control determinants captures macroeconomic policy variables, such as: 
inflation rate, balance of trade, government debt, government final consumption expenditures 
and net foreign direct investments (FDI). The inflation rate represents the percentage rate of 
change in consumer price level, while the balance of trade quantifies the difference between 
monetary value of exports and imports of output, as percent of GDP. The government debt 
captures general government gross debt as percent of GDP. The fourth variable, government 
final consumption expenditures, reveals the government final consumption expenditure as 
percentage of GDP. The last macroeconomic policy control variable is the net FDI and illustrates 
the difference between inward foreign direct investment and outward foreign direct investment 
as percent of GDP.  
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The variables for robustness refer to government effectiveness, freedom from corruption, 
literacy index and democratization level. The first variable explains the perceptions of the quality 
of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
the government's commitment to such policies (the level of -2.5 shows a weak governance 
performance, while the level of 2.5 a strong governance performance one). The second 
robustness variable, freedom from corruption, shows the corruption intensity (the score 100 
means low corruption, while a level of 0 indicates a very corrupt government). Next two 
variables, level of democratization and political durability, capture political aspects. First one is 
represented by Polity2 index, with values from +10 (strongly democratic regime) to -10 (strongly 
autocratic regime), while the second one, political regime durability, shows the number of years 
since the most recent regime change or the end of a transition period.  The last control variable is 
literacy index, indicates how many adults can read and write in a certain area or nation, as 
percent in total adult population.  
All control variables presented above could have consistent impact on collected tax revenues, 
as Mutascu (2012) argues. They are treated as elasticity, except the variables with not strictly 
positive values, such as: inflation rate, balance of trade, government debt, net FDI, government 
effectiveness, polity2 and regime durability. The descriptive statistics of variables and their 
sources are illustrates in Table 2, respectively Tables 3 in Appendix. 
In our panel-model approach, the model may have heterogeneity in the data. As the 
investigated sample is unbalanced, we test this propriety only in the case of period fixed-effects 
model, because the cross-section fixed-effects has singular matrix (the interest variables are 
dummy variables) and the random effects panel-models are not consistent under unbalanced 
data-set. In this demarche, F-test permits to choose between pooled model and fixed-effects 
model. The next section shows the main empirical results of explored function, performing 
several econometric scenarios (models 1-5), as Table 4, in Appendix, illustrates. 
 
 
3.  Results 
 
 
The most important empirical result, as Table 4 in Appendix reveals, shows that all interest 
religion dummy variables are significant in all scenarios (only Orthodox dummy variable is 
insignificant in OLS model 3). The Protestant and Muslim religion dummy variables are positive 
correlated with collected tax revenues as dependent variable, while the Catholic, Orthodox, 
Buddhist and Hindu religion dummy variables negative. All control variables also are significant, 
except the size of agricultural sector, inflation rate and literacy index.   
GDP per capita, size of industrial sector, balance of trade, government debt, government final 
consumption expenditures, government effectiveness, index of democracy and regime durability 
are positive correlated with dependent variable. Only two control variables are negative 
corrected with tax revenues: FDI and freedom of corruption. 
Further, we initiate the hypothesis tests to choose between pooled model and fixed-effects 
model. As the sample is unbalanced and the cross-section fixed-effects has singular matrix, only 
the period fixed-effects is taken into account. The values of F-test and Chi-square for period 
fixed-effects clearly show that the period fixed-effects model are preferred to the OLS 
estimations. In this case, all variables are significant, less the size of agricultural sector, inflation 
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rate and literacy index. The religion dummy variables and control variables confirm the same 
correlation signs obtained in the OLS models. These results also ascertain the main literature 
conclusions regarding the signs of collected tax revenues’ determinants.     
  The main empirical outputs, in the case of 123 investigated countries, for the period 1996-
2010, indicate that all considered control determinants have significant impact on collected tax 
revenues (except especially size of agricultural sector, inflation rate and literacy index), but the 
main finding reveals that the Protestant and Muslim religion dummy variables are significant and 
positive correlated with dependent variable, while the Catholic, Orthodox, Buddhist and Hindu 
religion dummy variables significant and negative. In respect to the religion dummy variables, 
the collected tax revenues tend to increase under Protestant and Muslim religions.  
 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
 
The collected tax revenues have a set of determinants. Some of them are from behavioural 
type, tax compliance being the most important. In this case, two main elements define it: tax 
moral and degree of law enforcement. Religion influences the tax revenues through tax moral 
component, with different intensity from one country to another. The empirical results show that 
only the Protestant and Muslim religions stimulate the collection of tax revenues, while the rest 
of religions don’t have a positive impact on government inputs. These findings confirm partially 
the main contributions of Furnham (1981), Guiso et al. (2003) and Torgler (2006).  
In the context of tax-policy implications, the study suggests that a significant increase of 
collected tax revenues, without a major negative reaction of taxpayers, can be easily obtained by 
public authority situated in Protestant or Muslim countries. The dogmas in these religions have a 
great importance in tax moral modelling. For the rest of countries, the negative impact of 
religious dogmas on collected tax revenues should be compensating by strong law enforcement.   
We conclude pointing out that the best taxation environment is offered by Protestant and 
Muslim religions. This research could be a very good starting for an extended investigation over 
tax burden - religion nexus.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Table 1: List of analyzed countries 
 
Countries 
Albania Central African Rep. Germany 
Lao People's 
Dem.Rep Niger   Swaziland  
Algeria Chad    Ghana   Latvia  Nigeria Sweden 
Argentina Chile Greece Lebanon Norway Switzerland         
Armenia China,P.R.: Mainland Guatemala  Lesotho Oman    Tajikistan 
Australia           Colombia Guyana  Libya   Pakistan Togo    
Austria Costa Rica Honduras   Lithuania  Panama  Trinidad and Tobago 
Azerbaijan, 
Rep. of Croatia Hungary 
Macedonia, 
FYR Paraguay   Tunisia 
Bahrain, 
Kingdom of Cyprus  India Madagascar Peru Turkey 
Bangladesh Czech Republic Indonesia  Malawi  Philippines Uganda  
Belarus Denmark Iran, I.R. of Malaysia   Poland  Ukraine 
Belgium Djibouti   Ireland Mali    Portugal United Arab Emirates 
Benin   Dominican Republic Israel  Mauritius Qatar 
United 
Kingdom       
Bolivia Ecuador Italy Mexico Romania United States 
Botswana   Egypt   Jamaica Moldova Russian Federation Uruguay 
Brazil El Salvador         Japan   Mongolia   Rwanda  Uzbekistan 
Bulgaria   Estonia Jordan Morocco Saudi Arabia Venezuela, Rep. Bol. 
Burkina Faso        Ethiopia   Kazakhstan Mozambique Senegal Vietnam 
Burundi Fiji    Kenya   Nepal Slovak Republic     Zambia 
Cambodia   Finland Korea, Republic of Netherlands Slovenia 
Cameroon   France Kuwait New Zealand         Spain 
Canada  Georgia Kyrgyz Republic     Nicaragua  Sudan 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Observations 
Tax revenues (US dollars) 130361.00 11955.51 4784971.00 109.70 405733.60 1358.00 
GDP per capita (US dollars) 10244.59 3676.30 93156.84 112.52 14272.50 1358.00 
Size of industrial sector as % of 
GDP 30.82 29.13 78.52 10.52 10.46 1358.00 
Size of agricultural sector as % of 
GDP 12.87 8.02 59.72 0.36 12.41 1358.00 
Inflation rate as % of GDP 6.37 4.07 132.82 -9.86 8.25 1358.00 
Balance of trade as % of GDP -4.42 -2.46 45.84 -101.73 14.08 1358.00 
General government gross debt as 
% of GDP 52.39 46.09 261.83 0.55 33.79 1358.00 
Government final consumption 
expenditure as % of GDP 15.80 15.65 42.95 2.68 5.73 1358.00 
Net FDI as percent of GDP 2.45 1.91 46.50 -22.79 4.59 1358.00 
Government effectiveness 0.20 -0.05 2.34 -1.62 0.97 1358.00 
Freedom of corruption 43.37 35.00 100.00 10.00 23.43 1358.00 
Polity2 index 4.96 8.00 10.00 -10.00 6.07 1358.00 
Political regime durability (years) 27.71 15.00 200.00 0.00 32.75 1358.00 
Literacy index 0.87 0.94 1.00 0.08 0.19 1358.00 
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Table 3: Source of data 
 
Variable Source 
Tax revenues (US dollars) 
International Monetary Fund online data-base 
(2011). 
 
GDP per capita (US dollars) United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) online data-base (2011). 
Size of industrial sector as % of GDP World Bank online data-base (2011). 
Size of agricultural sector as % of GDP World Bank online data-base (2011). 
Inflation rate as % of GDP International Monetary Fund online data-base (2011). 
Balance of trade as % of GDP International Monetary Fund online data-base (2011). 
General government gross debt as % of 
GDP 
International Monetary Fund online data-base 
(2011). 
Government final consumption expenditure 
as % of GDP World Bank online data-base (2011). 
Net FDI United Nations Development Programme online data-base (2011). 
Government effectiveness World Bank online data-base (2011). 
Freedom of corruption The Heritage Foundation online data-base (2012). 
Polity2 index 
Polity™ IV Project Political Regime Characteristics 
and Transitions, 1800-2010 Dataset (2011). 
 
Political regime durability 
Polity™ IV Project Political Regime Characteristics 
and Transitions, 1800-2010 Dataset (2011). 
 
Literacy index United Nations Development Programme online data-base (2011). 
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Table 4: Empirical results of panel regressions 
 
Dependent variable: ln tax revenues ($) 
Independent variables 
Model  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
constant 9.081580*** 
(0.108786) 
-1.735915*** 
(0.300970) 
-0.516856 
(0.674648) 
0.871478 
(0.804303) 
2.166552*** 
(0.790907) 
Catholic 
religion dummy 
0.203618*** 
(0.045198) 
-0.580461*** 
(0.034500) 
-0.431499*** 
(0.050371) 
-0.451207*** 
(0.049600) 
-0.404427*** 
(0.048147) 
Protestant 
religion dummy 
0.989165*** 
(0.045838) 
0.565599*** 
(0.045197) 
0.693521*** 
(0.080850) 
0.545422*** 
(0.076933) 
0.540859*** 
(0.075773) 
Orthodox 
religion dummy 
-0.350237*** 
(0.055346) 
-0.343276*** 
(0.045612) 
-0.080993 
(0.095244) 
-0.267476** 
(0.106446) 
-0.280992** 
(0.112304) 
Muslim 
religion dummy 
0.248175*** 
(0.020903) 
0.129474*** 
(0.022754) 
0.114827** 
(0.055867) 
0.100600* 
(0.058568) 
0.123362** 
(0.058738) 
Buddhist 
religion dummy 
0.716225*** 
(0.047349) 
-0.461463*** 
(0.074263) 
-0.447488*** 
(0.070668) 
-0.568022*** 
(0.051597) 
-0.538644*** 
(0.045822) 
Hindu 
religion dummy 
 
-0.714310*** 
(0.028302) 
-0.938018*** 
(0.046955) 
-0.491976*** 
(0.057470) 
-0.303095*** 
(0.046925) 
-0.359943*** 
(0.066135) 
ln GDP per capita  1.038429*** 
(0.029741) 
0.962284*** 
(0.043863) 
0.873055*** 
(0.079814) 
0.679500*** 
(0.059202) 
ln size of industrial as % of 
GDP 
 0.892161*** 
(0.052207) 
0.497175*** 
(0.066154) 
0.685203*** 
(0.067199) 
0.766979*** 
(0.076865) 
ln size of agricultural as % 
of GDP 
 -0.066053* 
(0.039067) 
0.007695 
(0.077001) 
0.043175 
(0.077405) 
-0.022886 
(0.078524) 
inflation rate (%)   0.006721 
(0.004341) 
0.006825 
(0.004588) 
0.005713 
(0.004192) 
balance of trade as % of 
GDP 
  0.028802*** 
(0.001966) 
0.028390*** 
(0.002150) 
0.032494*** 
(0.001981) 
ln general government 
gross debt as % of GDP 
  0.004402*** 
(0.000489) 
0.004379*** 
(0.000434) 
0.006056*** 
(0.000516) 
ln government final 
consumption expenditure as 
% of GDP 
 
  0.174057** 
(0.078338) 
0.273946*** 
(0.073644) 
0.296052*** 
(0.083929) 
net FDI as % in GDP   -0.038467*** 
(0.007407) 
-0.031476*** 
(0.007252) 
-0.032946*** 
(0.007456) 
government effectiveness    0.276582*** 
(0.076168) 
0.471468*** 
(0.057087) 
ln freedom of corruption    -0.540415*** 
(0.061764) 
-0.539733*** 
(0.061348) 
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polity2 index    0.014994*** 
(0.005376) 
0.014940*** 
(0.005319) 
political regime durability    0.007520*** 
(0.000821) 
0.006797*** 
(0.000869) 
ln literacy index    -0.062048 
(0.063727) 
0.022390 
(0.064287) 
Type of estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS - FE:PE 
Model summary 
R-squared 0.021138 0.633653 0.667375 0.67495 0.685044 
F-test  
for fixed effects     
3.030745 
(0.0001) 
Chi-square 
    
42.837238 
(0.0001) 
(a) (…) denotes the standard error. 
(b) PLS represents panel least squares. 
(c) FE:PE denotes period fixed-effects.  
(d) ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 % level of significance, respectively. 
 
 
